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JURIES, DEMOCRACY, AND PETTY CRIME
John D. King*
ABSTRACT
The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is basic to the design of American criminal justice and to the structure
of American government. Guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, the Sixth Amendment, and every one of
the original state constitutions, the criminal jury was seen as critically important not only to the protection of
individual rights but also to the architecture of American democracy. The vast majority of criminal prosecutions
today, however, are resolved without even the prospect of community review by a jury. Despite the textual clarity
of the guarantee, the Supreme Court has long recognized a “petty offense” exception to the right to trial by jury.
As systems of mass adjudication and hyper-incarceration have developed over the past several decades, a parallel
process of collateral consequences has also arisen and is now well-documented. Recognizing that a conviction for
even a low-level offense can have devastating effects, some courts have begun to narrowly interpret the “petty
offense” exception, especially where a conviction could have severe immigration-related consequences. As a result,
some jurisdictions now provide stronger procedural protections for non-citizen defendants than for citizen defendants
charged with similar offenses. Although these courts are certainly correct in characterizing these offenses as
“serious” and thereby providing those defendants a right to a jury trial, their reasoning imports a defendant-specific
subjectivity that is in tension with prior Supreme Court guidance, and the results pose questions of legitimacy as
different defendants are treated differently because of citizenship status.
As advocates push to expand the right to trial by jury, the Supreme Court should revisit the “petty offense” exception
in light of the expansive web of collateral consequences that has developed in the past few decades. In Ramos v.
Louisiana, the Court grappled with the question of stare decisis and overruled decades-old precedent on the
constitutionality of non-unanimous jury verdicts, recognizing that the Court should be most willing to reconsider
precedent in cases involving constitutional criminal procedure. At the same time, state legislatures should address
the problem by extending the state right to jury trials to cover all criminal prosecutions. The implications of such
changes would extend beyond a procedural reform that would affect the rights of individual defendants. Expansion
of the jury trial right would constitute a meaningful structural reform in democratizing criminal justice at a time
when such change is needed to establish the popular legitimacy of the criminal justice system.

INTRODUCTION
The right to trial by jury is a defining feature of both the American system
of criminal justice and the American form of government. Central to the
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vision of the Founders, the jury trial right is guaranteed both in Article III of
the Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment to the Bill of Rights, as well as
in every state constitution from the founding era. This fundamental right,
however, has long been limited by a judicially-created exception for petty
offenses. For well over a century, the Supreme Court has read into the
federal constitutional jury trial guarantee an extra-textual limitation that
exempts from its coverage the majority of criminal prosecutions. This “petty
offense exception” has evolved over the years to establish a presumption that
any criminal offense for which the maximum penalty is less than six months
incarceration is outside of the scope of the jury trial right.
The presumption of pettiness can be rebutted if the defendant can show
indicia other than incarceration that demonstrate that the offense should be
considered serious. Since articulating this rebuttable presumption in 1989,
the United States Supreme Court has not considered a case in which the
defendant was successful in rebutting this presumption. State courts,
however, have recently shown a willingness to expand the jury trial right to
cases in which the defendant, if convicted, would face collateral
consequences more severe than any direct punishment. Most commonly,
courts considering misdemeanors that could result in deportation have on
occasion found those defendants to be entitled to a jury trial even where the
maximum potential period of incarceration is less than six months.
These decisions present a profound challenge to the viability of the petty
offense exception to the jury trial right. It strains logic and common sense to
argue that a criminal charge that could result in deportation (or the loss of
the right to carry a firearm or to remain in one’s home, for example) is not a
serious offense. But because collateral consequences do not apply equally to
all criminal defendants, the application of this doctrine requires a subjective,
defendant-specific inquiry to determine whether a particular criminal offense
is a serious one, as applied to that defendant. In cases involving immigration
consequences, for example, a non-citizen now can enjoy greater
constitutional protections than a citizen charged with the same offense. This
subjective defendant-specific approach is unpredictable and cumbersome,
and it conflicts with other Supreme Court guidance indicating that this
analysis should be an objective one. Supreme Court doctrine on the petty
offense exception is on a collision course with itself.1 Because of the ubiquity
and seriousness of collateral consequences for even minor criminal offenses

1

See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“The Roe framework . . . is clearly on a collision course with itself.”).

June 2022 ]

JURIES, DEMOCRACY, AND PETTY CRIME

819

in today’s criminal justice system, the jury trial right should be applied
categorically to all criminal offenses.
Strengthening the role of the jury in the American criminal justice system
is important both symbolically and practically. Calls to reform and transform
the way American police and courts address allegations of wrongdoing make
this an opportune time to re-examine the system from top to bottom. An
embrace of the criminal trial jury is at once a progressive step forward and a
return to the principles of the past. In his First Inaugural Address, Thomas
Jefferson argued that “[t]he wisdom of our Sages, & blood of our Heroes,
have been devoted to the[] attainment [of trial by jury.] [It] should be the
Creed of our political faith.”2 In contrast to this vision, we have created in
practice a modern system of juryless adjudication, especially for low-level
crimes. The prosecution of petty crimes, however, is part and parcel with
the system of over-policing and mass incarceration that is rightly at the center
of attention for today’s reformers and abolitionists. Our current system of
juryless adjudication should be addressed along with other solutions. One
wonders how a democratically-selected New York jury might have reacted,
for example, if asked to review the case of Eric Garner, charged with the sale
of loose cigarettes?3 Would the knowledge that a jury might review their
actions have changed the behavior of those police officers in how they
approached Garner?
Amidst recent calls for abolition and radical rethinking of the criminal
justice system,4 what is the value of a discrete doctrinal reform proposal like
the expansion of the right to jury trial? Some might argue that such a reform
serves more to legitimize the continuation of a structurally unjust and racist
system than to effect any meaningful change.5 Even if not actively counterproductive, is such a proposal tantamount to re-arranging the deck chairs on

2
3

4

5

Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) (transcript available in the Library of
Congress).
Garner, of course, was the Black man who was killed by New York City police officers in 2014 after
they arrested him on suspicion of selling loose cigarettes. See Al Baker, J. David Goodman &
Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-statenisland.html [https://perma.cc/4EJU-UAKK].
See Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives, 8
UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 109 (2013) (calling for “an openness to unfinished alternatives—
a willingness to engage in partial, in process, incomplete reformist efforts that seek to displace
conventional criminal law administration as a primary mechanism for social order maintenance”).
See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2196–97
(2013) (critiquing rights discourse as diversion from racial and economic critiques of the criminal
justice system and legitimation of the status quo).
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the Titanic? 6 Of course, any procedural reform will fail to address and
remediate problems of fairness and justice if it does not address broader
structural problems with the system. A re-invigoration of the criminal jury,
however, has the potential to be a fundamental change in the structure of
criminal adjudication, if taken seriously. Just as Thomas Jefferson said that
it should be “the Creed of our political faith,”7 a meaningful embrace of trial
by jury should be seen as a political change as much as an expansion of
individual legal rights.
Another critique of this proposal has to do with the seeming obsolescence
of the criminal trial itself as a means of adjudicating guilt. Justice Kennedy
accurately described the American criminal justice system as “for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”8 Given the remarkably high
rates of plea bargaining with all kinds of criminal charges, no doctrinal
reform by itself will achieve meaningful change. But if an expansion of the
right to criminal jury trial is seen as a step toward a re-invigoration of the
jury in criminal adjudication, such a proposal could be an important part of
a re-imagining of American criminal adjudication with affected
communities, rather than judges, as central decisionmakers.
Expansion of the criminal jury right would be consistent with a broader
momentum toward the re-democratization of criminal justice. Critics of the
modern trend toward bureaucratization of the criminal adjudication system
argue for a renewed engagement of communities with the system “not only
because popular participation is good for defendants, but also because it
strengthens American democracy.”9 As it has grown exponentially larger in
the last several decades, criminal justice has become a vast bureaucracy,
ruled not by citizens but by “a professionalized corps of officials and experts”
applying specialized knowledge and expertise to identify a certain end and
6

7
8
9

See id. at 2197 (“Procedural fairness not only produces faith in the outcome of individual trials; it
reinforces faith in the legal system as a whole.”) (quoting Michael O’Donnell, Crime and Punishment:
On
William
Stuntz,
THE
NATION
(Jan.
11,
2012),
http://www.thenation.com/article/archive/crime-and-punishment-william-stuntz/
[https://perma.cc/W482-FYYG].
Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) (transcript available in the Library of
Congress).
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (Kennedy, J.).
Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Criminal Justice Citizenship, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1023, 1023–24 (2020); see also
Jenny Carroll, The Jury As Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825 (2015) (examining the possibility of the
jury as a unique democratic space); ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS:
A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION (2013) (exploring the opportunity jury duty
provides to reflect on individual constitutional responsibilities); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court
Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014) (asserting that audience members in
criminal courtrooms are uniquely situated to help restore public participation and accountability).
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“us[ing] the technical apparatus of government to secure that end as
efficiently as possible.”10 Against this powerful current is a movement to
revitalize juries both to give legitimacy to a criminal justice system rightly
under attack for its structural unfairness and racist underpinnings and also
to give voice to the marginalized communities that are the subjects of that
system.11
Just as the Founders saw the criminal jury as a protection against a
corrupt or overzealous state, it could and should occupy the same role today.
Described in 1788 as “the democratic branch of the judiciary power,”12 juries
composed of members of the community serve an important structural role,
reviewing the conduct and decisions of police, prosecutors, and judges in
carrying out the business of deciding culpability and punishment. Alexander
Hamilton extolled the virtues of a judicial system with shared power between
judges and juries, referring to the power-sharing system as “a double security
. . . [which] tends to preserve the purity of both institutions.”13 In addition
to the beneficial effects on the administration of justice, community
participation in juries strengthens democracy itself.14
An expansion of the criminal jury trial right should be seen as one part of
a much larger project: the democratization of the criminal adjudication
process. Seen as a part of the re-centering of the adjudication process,
however, away from professionals and bureaucrats to communities, a reorientation of the criminal justice system around juries is a more profound
structural shift. This move is one among many “non-reformist reforms” that

10
11

12
13

14

Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1379 (2017)
(emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249,
306–07 (2019) (“If we can value public participation beyond representation by police and
prosecution, then we can . . . mov[e] toward local criminal adjudication that is more responsive to
the multidimensional demands of the popular will.”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury:
The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33 (2003)
(exploring whether and when the legislature should place the authority to apply laws that trigger
criminal punishments with judges instead of juries); FERGUSON, supra note 9.
Essays by a Farmer No. IV (Mar. 21, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 36, 38 (Herbert
J. Storing, ed., 1981) (emphasis omitted).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton went on to elaborate on the
importance of juries in the judicial system: “By increasing the obstacles to success, it discourages
attempts to seduce the integrity of either. The temptations to prostitution, which the judges might
have to surmount, must certainly be much fewer, while the co-operation of a jury is necessary, than
they might be, if they had themselves the exclusive determination of all causes.” Id.
Alexis de Tocqueville described jury service as a “free school” that would “[serve] to give the mind
of all citizens a part of the habits of mind of the judge.” 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 448 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans., 2010) (1835).
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“aim to build grassroots power as they redress the crises of our times.”15 Any
discrete doctrinal change—even one as expansive as extending jury rights for
all criminal offenses—will have little effect on broader structures of power in
the criminal justice system if not tied to a wider critique.16
Section One describes the history of the right to trial by jury and the
development of the petty offense exception. Section Two examines the neardisappearance of the jury trial as a means of adjudicating criminal
allegations, especially with regard to low-level offenses, and reflects on the
significance of this development for the criminal justice system. Section
Three traces the recent and dramatic rise of collateral consequences of
criminal convictions. Section Four analyzes recent decisions of state courts
giving broad reading to the jury trial right and declining to apply the petty
offense exception in cases involving collateral consequences of misdemeanor
convictions. Finally, Section Five argues that the realities of today’s criminal
justice system have rendered unworkable the offense-specific analysis that the
Supreme Court created to determine when the right to jury trial applies. I
conclude by arguing that courts, legislatures, and advocates should push for
a more absolute jury trial right, as the constitutional text suggests.
I. THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT AND PETTY CRIMES
A. History of the Jury Trial Right
In the American system of criminal adjudication, no procedural right is
more basic than the right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court has called this
right “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,”17 and Justice Hugo
Black described it as “one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in
the English-speaking world.”18 The founders of the Republic considered the

15

16

17
18

Amna A. Akbar, Demands for a Democratic Political Economy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 90, 98 (2020).
Akbar uses the term “non-reformist reforms,” which was coined by André Gorz. See id. at 100–01
(citing ANDRÉ GORZ, STRATEGY FOR LABOR: A RADICAL PROPOSAL 7 (Martin A. Nicolaus &
Victoria Ortiz trans., 1967)). Gorz used the term for a reform that does not adhere to “capitalist
needs, criteria, and rationales” but rather calls for “the creation of new centers of democratic
power.” Id. at 7 n.3.
See Akbar, supra note 15, at 103 (arguing that “reform projects are contradictory gambits if the aim
is transformation; they always have the possibility of reifying the status quo”). In explaining her
distinction between reformist reforms and non-reformist reforms, Akbar argues that “[w]hereas
reformist reforms aim to improve, ameliorate, legitimate, and even advance the underlying system,
non-reformist reforms aim for political, economic, social transformation . . . . [Non-reformist
reforms] aim to shift power away from elites and toward the masses of people.” Id. at 104–05.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 34 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
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right so important that they included it both in Article III of the
Constitution19 and in the Sixth Amendment.20
The Constitution and Bill of Rights were drafted within a context of
distrust of government and a desire to restrict the powers of the state. 21
Thomas Jefferson believed that trial by jury was “the only anchor ever yet
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its
constitution.” 22 More than simply a safeguard available to individuals
accused of crime, trial by jury was seen by the founders as essential to the
democratic structure of the new republic. The decision to provide so strong
a guarantee “reflected a fundamental decision about the exercise of official
power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the
citizen to one judge or a group of judges [as well as] an insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.”23 On
virtually no other point was there such widespread agreement as the need to
protect the right to trial by jury:
The friends and adversaries of the [proposed constitution], if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if
there is any difference between them, it consists in this: the former regard it
as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it as the very palladium
of free government.24

Even prior to the drafting of the Constitution or Bill of Rights, however,
and long before the Supreme Court defined its contours in the American
system, the right to trial by jury was well-established at English common law.
Blackstone described the means by which criminal allegations were to be
decided at common law: “the truth of every accusation . . . should afterwards
be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant’s] equals
and neighbours, indifferently chosen, and superior to all suspicion.” 25

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by jury . . . .”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating explicitly the rights of an accused in criminal prosecutions,
including the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury).
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1140 (1991) (outlining
the concerns of Anti-Federalists about vesting powers in a federal government).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 The PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 266, 269) (Julian Boyd, ed., 1958).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 432–33 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan,
eds., 2001).
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151–52 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 343 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1899)).
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Ultimately, the right can be traced back more than 800 years to Magna
Carta.26
The text of the jury trial guarantee—both in Article III and in the Sixth
Amendment—seems to allow for no exceptions. Just as Article III requires
that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury . . . ,” 27 the Sixth Amendment guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . . .”28 Although neither the Constitution nor the Bill of
Rights give further guidance on what is meant by “trial by an impartial jury,”
subsequent caselaw has interpreted the phrase to require unanimity,29 and a
trial jury selected without racial 30 or gender 31 discrimination. 32 Some
members of the Constitutional Convention wanted the right to trial by jury
to be explicitly guaranteed for all federal criminal charges.33 By specifically
exempting impeachment from the guarantee, 34 the Article III jury right
seems implicitly to include all other federal charges.35
The right to trial by jury was seen as so fundamental to the structure of
government that, notwithstanding the existence of the federal constitutional
right, every state has also included a provision guaranteeing trial by jury in

26
27
28

29
30
31
32
33
34

35

See id. at 151–52 (tracing the history of the right to trial by jury back to its origins).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The American colonists demonstrated their clear support and enthusiasm
for a jury trial right even before passage of the Constitution, mentioning the right in resolutions of
the First Congress of the American Colonies in 1765 and in the Declaration of Independence. See
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152 (citing SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 270 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959)).
See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires
a unanimous verdict in order to convict).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 (1986) (prohibiting attorneys from using peremptory
challenges to remove prospective jurors on the basis of race).
See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits discrimination in jury selection based on gender).
The Court has also discussed other requirements, such as requiring that venire pools feature a fair
cross-section of the population. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (“[S]ome of the framers apparently believed that
the Constitution designated trial by jury as the exclusive method of determining guilt.”).
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed;
but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress
may by Law have directed.”).
See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 489–90 (2009)
(arguing that the “plain meaning [of a constitutional provision] constitutes a minimal baseline in
protection of individual liberty” and that “it is difficult to claim that the Sixth Amendment provides
lesser protections of individual liberty than that evident from a plain reading of the text”).
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their state constitutions.36 This was the only such right that every single state
constitution drafted during the Revolutionary period had in common.37 As
with the federal Constitution, the right was seen by states as not only
protecting individual liberty but also as a means of structuring democracy
and providing a check on government power. 38 Most states provide a
broader right to a criminal jury than does the federal constitutional
doctrine.39
B. The Petty Offense Exception to the Jury Trial Right
Although the text of both Article III and the Sixth Amendment is
unambiguous and absolute, the Supreme Court has ruled that the
constitutional right to trial by jury does not extend to “petty offenses.”40 This
“petty offense exception” to the jury trial right dates back at least to the late
nineteenth century, when the Court held that the jury trial right “could never
have been intended to embrace every species of accusation involving either
criminal or penal consequences.” 41 The Court endorsed this historical
argument many years later in Duncan v. Louisiana, drawing on history to
support its conclusion: “So-called petty offenses were tried without juries
both in England and in the Colonies . . . . There is no substantial evidence
that the Framers intended to depart from this established common-law

36

37

38

39
40
41

See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 153 (recognizing that every state constitution adopted by the original states
included a constitutional provision protecting the right to a jury trial). See also David L. Hemond,
Brief Review of Right in 49 States to Jury Trial for Minor Crimes, CONN. L. REVISION COMM’N (1998)
https://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc/recommendations/1999%20recommendations/JuryTrial49StatesR
pt.htm [https://perma.cc/VNA6-Z29N] (summarizing the right to criminal jury trial in each state);
POUND CIV. JUST. INST., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, COURT
DECISIONS, AND SCHOLARSHIP ON TRIAL BY JURY AND THE RIGHT TO REMEDY (James E.
Rooks, Jr. ed., 2018).
See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 227 (1985) (noting that of the twelve states
that framed constitutions, the only right secured by all was the trial by jury in criminal cases);
Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 133, 136
(explaining the importance of the right to criminal jury trial in American history).
See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155–56 (“A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to
prevent oppression by the government . . . . [The right is] an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”). See also
Singer, 380 U.S. at 31 (“The [jury trial] clause was clearly intended to protect the accused from
oppression by the Government.”).
See infra section xx.
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989).
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552 (1888). See also Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty
Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926); George Kaye,
Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (1959).
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practice . . . .” 42 The development of this doctrine, however, is open to
critique on historical, textual, and practical grounds.
Rejecting a long history of evaluating the right to trial by jury by
subjectively evaluating the moral stigma of an offense, the Supreme Court in
1968 opted for a more objective approach based on the legislatively
authorized penalty for an offense. In Duncan v. Louisiana and later in Baldwin
v. New York, the Court adopted “authorized imprisonment” as a general
proxy for “seriousness of offense.” Prior to these cases, courts had evaluated
whether an offense was “petty,” and therefore not within the scope of the
federal constitutional right to trial by jury, by looking at the moral stigma
that society attached to the allegation.43
This subjective “moral stigma” approach had led to some counterintuitive results in the first few decades of the twentieth century. In Schick v.
United States, for example, the Court considered the case of a man charged
with the purchase for resale of oleomargarine that did not bear a tax stamp.44
Although this could be classified as a type of tax fraud, the Court concluded
that the offense was “not one necessarily involving any moral delinquency”
and so found that it was a petty offense for which the defendant had no
federal constitutional right to trial by jury. 45 Twenty-five years later,
however, the Court came to a different conclusion in a case involving a
charge entitled reckless driving “so as to endanger property and
individuals.” 46 In District of Columbia v. Colts, the Court held that the
defendant was entitled to trial by jury because the charge involved an
allegation of actions that were malum in se and “an act of such obvious
depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be to shock the
general moral sense.”47
Because of the unpredictability of the subjective approach, the Supreme
Court pursued a more mathematical approach in the late twentieth century,
seeking “more ‘objective indications of the seriousness with which society

42
43

44
45
46
47

Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
In at least one 19th-century case, the Supreme Court looked to whether an offense was indictable
at common law in order to determine whether it was a “serious offense” for purposes of the federal
constitutional right to trial by jury. In Callan v. Wilson, the Court reversed a conviction for
conspiracy on the grounds that, because conspiracy was an indictable offense at common law, it
could not be considered a petty offense and therefore fell within the scope of the right to trial by
jury. 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888).
See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 67 (1904) (stating the statutory requirements of the offense).
See id. at 67 (signaling that the small penalty was indicia of the seriousness of the offense).
282 U.S. 63, 70 (1930).
Id. at 73.
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regards the offense.’”48 The defendant in Duncan v. Louisiana was charged
with battery, an offense classified as a misdemeanor under state law and that
carried a maximum sentence of two years of incarceration and a fine of
$300.49 Mr. Duncan’s request for a trial by jury was denied and he was tried
and convicted by a judge, who sentenced him to a 60-day period of
incarceration and a $150 fine.50 After noting that “the boundaries of the
petty offense category have always been ill-defined,” the Court established
the legislatively-created maximum penalty as the primary indicator of
whether an offense should be considered petty or serious for purposes of the
federal constitutional right to trial by jury.51 Unlike in the context of the
federal constitutional right to appointed counsel, which the Court had
established five years prior in Gideon v. Wainwright,52 the Duncan Court focused
its analysis on the maximum authorized sentence rather than the sentence
actually imposed.
The Duncan Court did not draw a bright line between serious and petty
offenses based on authorized imprisonment but established that an offense
carrying a maximum sentence of two years could not be considered petty.
The Court further made clear that the maximum authorized sentence, rather
than the sentence actually imposed, was the salient factor for purposes of the
federal constitutional right to trial by jury.53 In describing how to distinguish
between petty and serious crimes, the Court sought to determine the opinion
of the local legislature, looking to “the penalty authorized by the law of the
locality . . . ‘as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.’”54 Years earlier,
the Court had hinted at a desire to move away from subjective analysis and
toward objective standards and consistency in determining when the jury
right applies, holding that “[d]oubts must be resolved, not subjectively by
recourse of the judge to his own sympathy and emotions, but by objective
standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the
community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.” 55 The

48
49
50
51
52
53

54
55

Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 (quoting Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969)).
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 146 (1968) (outlining the penalty for simple battery under
Louisiana law).
See id. at 146 (summarizing the disposition of the case at the trial court level).
Id. at 160.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that counsel must be provided to
ensure a fair trial in a serious criminal case).
See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159 (“[T]he penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance
in determining whether it is serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to
the mandates of the Sixth Amendment.”).
Id. at 160 (quoting District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937)).
Clawans, 300 U.S. at 628 (1937).
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Court reiterated this need for objectivity in Duncan, promising to “refer to
objective criteria” 56 in deciding when the petty offense exception should
apply.57
The Court broadened the scope of the jury right two years later in Baldwin
v. New York.58 The defendant in Baldwin was charged with a single count of
jostling,59 which carried a maximum potential sentence of one year.60 The
Court agreed with the defendant that the one-year maximum potential
penalty was sufficient for the offense to qualify as a serious offense, entitling
him to a jury trial. Justices Black and Douglas, concurring in the judgment,
would have found that there was no petty offense exception to the right to
trial by jury. Hewing closely to the text of the Sixth Amendment and the
Article III jury guarantee, Justice Black wrote that balancing efficiency with
a clear constitutional safeguard for criminal defendants constituted “judicial
mutilation of our written Constitution.” 61 Because the text of the
constitutional jury trial guarantee referred to “all crimes,” he argued, the
Court should not create a limitation to its scope.62
Most recently, the Court considered the issue of whether an offense could
be considered serious even though the maximum authorized imprisonment
fell below the six-month presumptive standard established in Baldwin. In the
quarter century after Baldwin, some courts had held that other factors could
render an offense “serious” for purposes of the federal constitutional right to
trial by jury even when the maximum authorized imprisonment fell below
six months.63 In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, the Court considered a case
involving the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, punishable by
a maximum sentence of six months in jail and a fine of $1,000. The

56
57

58
59
60
61
62
63

See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161 (offering the standard used to determine whether the authorized crime
of seriousness of the punishment was sufficient to require a jury trial).
See also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969) (“In determining whether a particular
offense can be classified as ‘petty,’ this Court has sought objective indications of the seriousness with
which society regards the offense . . . . The most relevant indication of the seriousness of an offense
is the severity of the penalty authorized for its commission.”) (quoting Clawans, 300 U.S. at 628).
See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (recounting the decision in Duncan and stating the
need for clarification on the line between petty and serious offenses).
See id. at 67 n.1 (defining “jostling” as a form of pickpocketing).
See id. at 67 (assigning the crime of jostling a maximum punishment of one-year imprisonment).
Id. at 75 (Black, J., concurring).
Id.
See e.g., United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that the offense is serious
not due to the punishment but because the crime itself is serious); United States v. Hamdan, 552
F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a $500 fine is evidence a crime is serious); Rife v.
Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, 564–65 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that where judges can issue consecutive
sentences, the crime can be considered serious enough to require a jury trial).
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legislature had mandated additional penalties, however, that could include
community service, alcohol education classes, and the drivers’ license
suspension of anyone convicted of this offense. The defendants in Blanton
argued that these additional consequences, in addition to the potential
incarceration and fine, rendered the offense serious and entitled them to trial
by jury.
Recognizing the presumptive line drawn in Baldwin by the legislativelyauthorized maximum penalties, the Blanton Court explained that even
defendants charged with presumptively petty offenses could, in “rare
situation[s],” demonstrate that “any additional statutory penalties, viewed in
conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in
question is a ‘serious’ one.”64 The defendants in Blanton were not able to
make this showing, but the Court made clear that legislative factors other
than simply incarceration and fine were relevant factors in this
determination. If the legislature “packs an offense it deems ‘serious’ with
onerous penalties that nonetheless ‘do not puncture the 6-month
incarceration line,’” 65 then the right to trial by jury may still apply.
The Blanton standard, like the early twentieth-century focus on “moral
stigma,” has been criticized as being too subjective and unpredictable.
Blanton was a very fact-specific opinion and provided little guidance to lower
courts attempting to interpret what might elevate a presumptively petty
offense to a serious one. The petitioner in that case argued that, in addition
to the six-month maximum period of incarceration that he faced for a charge
of driving under the influence, the additional potential consequences made
his charge a serious offense and therefore, entitled him to a jury. 66 The
potential additional consequences cited by the petitioner included: (1) 48
hours of community service dressed in clothing identifying him as someone
convicted of DUI; (2) a fine of $1,000; (3) a suspension of his driver’s license;
and (4) mandatory alcohol abuse education at his own expense.67 The Court
found that it could not fully evaluate the stigmatizing clothing requirement
because the record failed to describe the clothing or the circumstances in
64
65

66
67

Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543.
See id. (ensuring that a trial is available to defendants where the legislature has included additional
consequences, but the term of incarceration is less than six months) (quoting Pet’rs’ Br. at 16,
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989) (No. 87-1437)).
See id. at 543–44 (assessing whether the term of imprisonment and additional statutory penalties
were sufficient to consider DUI a serious offense).
See id. at 539–40 (listing the alternative punishments that a court may impose for the offense of DUI
in this case).
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which it was required to be worn and, similarly, dismissed without much
consideration the license suspension because the record was not clear on
whether the suspension would be concurrent with any term of incarceration,
in which case it would likely be irrelevant.68 After discounting these potential
additional consequences because of an unclear record, the Court held that
even “[v]iewed together, the statutory penalties are not so severe that DUI
must be deemed a ‘serious’ offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”69
The Supreme Court further narrowed the jury trial right in Lewis v. United
States, in which it held that a defendant facing multiple misdemeanor charges
carrying an aggregate potential sentence of over six months is not
constitutionally guaranteed a jury trial.70 As long as no single charge carried
a potential sentence of six months or more, reasoned the Court, the
defendant was not charged with a “serious offense” and therefore was not
entitled to a jury trial.71 Concurring separately, Justice Kennedy referred to
the majority opinion as “one of the most serious incursions on the right to
jury trial in the Court’s history.”72
Despite its long history, the petty offense exception has been the subject
of scholarly criticism, subject to attack on textual, historical, and practical
grounds. Of the various procedural safeguards found in the Sixth
Amendment, most apply universally, without regard to seriousness of crime.
But two such safeguards—the right to trial by jury and the right to counsel—
apply only to “serious” crimes, and the subset of “serious” crimes is defined
differently for each right.73 Textually, it is difficult to justify this disparity
since the term “in all criminal prosecutions” applies to each of the provisions
of the Sixth Amendment.
Supporters of the petty offense exception argue that the textual
guarantees in the Bill of Rights must be interpreted in light of the common

68
69
70
71
72

73

Id. at 544, 544 n.9 (minimizing the seriousness of the suspension because of the potential concurrent
prison sentence and availability of a restricted license after 45 days).
Id. at 545.
Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 323 (1996).
See id. at 323–24 (declining to grant a right to jury trial when a defendant is prosecuted for multiple
petty offenses).
Id. at 331 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Kennedy and Breyer concurred with the majority in
Lewis because the trial judge had said in advance of trial that the total aggregate sentence would
not exceed six months. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the critical factor is
what the legislature authorized rather than what the judge actually imposed.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159–60 (1968) (applying the right to a jury trial only to
serious crimes and defining seriousness); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972)
(concluding that under some circumstances petty offenses may require the representation of
counsel).
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law as it existed at the time of the enactment of those rights. Because
common law appears to have recognized a petty offense exception to the jury
right, as the Court reasoned in Callan v. Wilson,74 the Sixth Amendment must
be read to include such an exception as well. The Court, however, has on
many occasions held that the procedural safeguards in the Bill of Rights are
broader and more protective than practices at common law.75
Others have argued that there was no petty offense exception to the jury
trial right at common law, and that both the text and the history of the right
to trial by jury support application of the right to all criminal charges.76
[I]t appears that one Supreme Court opinion carelessly expressed support
for the petty offense doctrine in dictum while a later Court cavalierly
attached precedential value to those statements without examining the
context in which they were made. Several years later, in a stunning ipse
dixit, the Supreme Court declared the petty offense issue to be “settled.”77

Notwithstanding these criticisms, the Court has recognized the petty
offense exception for more than a century and unanimously endorsed the
idea when it most recently came before the Court.78
The Court’s use of history in crafting the petty offense exception has
come under scrutiny and criticism. While cases in the early part of the
twentieth century invoked the common law at the time of the ratification to
justify the exclusion of petty crimes from the jury right, this analysis may have
been founded on a misunderstanding of the historical practices.
While it is undoubtedly true that petty crimes were subject to summary trials
during the common law, so were non-petty crimes. Moreover, as far as the

74
75
76

77
78

Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888). But see Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense
Doctrine, 4 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 7, 13 & n.72 (1994) (critiquing the Court’s reasoning in Callan).
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973);
Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 7, 13 (1994).
See Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 7, 13 (1994)
(“Indeed, it is far from evident that the common law recognized a petty offense exception to the
right to trial by jury.”) (citing George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245,
246–47 (1959)); see also Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 78 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The
words of the Constitution upon this subject are clear and explicit. They leave no room for
interpretation. Its express mandate is that ‘the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment,
shall be by jury.’”).
Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 7, 14 (1994).
See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 (1989) (defining offenses with maximum prison terms of six months or
less as presumptively petty); United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1993) (requiring a
determination that an offensive serious to entitle a defendant to a trial); Lewis v. United States, 518
U.S. 322, 326–27 (1996) (stating that petty offenses are not triable by jury unless they are sufficiently
serious).
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colonies go, many either had no constitutional right to a jury trial or had
limited that right to serious crimes or even capital cases.79

Most convincingly, none of the relatively few federal crimes at the time
of the drafting could have been characterized as “petty” and, because the
Constitution and Bill of Rights was directed at constraining the power of the
federal government, it makes little sense to argue that the Framers considered
the treatment of petty crimes in any way.80
Some constitutional rules of criminal procedure are absolute and others
vary according to the severity of the crime being adjudicated.81 In Brinegar v.
United States, Justice Jackson, in dissent, argued that the government should
face greater constraints investigating and prosecuting petty crimes than
serious crimes. 82 The Court has approved of this principle in certain
contexts, holding that certain punishments are constitutionally impermissible
for less serious crimes or for crimes committed by juveniles,83 and that police
are entitled to use deadly force only in certain circumstances involving
suspects who may have committed certain serious crimes. 84 The “petty
offense” exception to the Sixth Amendment, which applies in different ways
to the right to trial by jury and the right to counsel, is another example of the
variable applicability of constitutional rules of criminal procedure.
II. DISAPPEARANCE OF CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS
The near disappearance of criminal trials as a means of adjudicating guilt
is well-documented. 85 Although the total number of federal criminal
defendants more than doubled between 1962 and 2002, 86 the number of
79
80
81
82
83

84

85

86

Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 522 (2009) (citing
George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 248–57 (1959)).
See id. at 549 (listing federal crimes in existence at the time of the ratification of the Sixth
Amendment).
See generally Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957 (2004).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that judicial
exceptions should depend on the gravity of the offense).
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty
for the crime of rape violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (ruling that a mandatory sentence of life
without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment).
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (requiring police officers to have probable cause that a
fleeing unarmed felony suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the
officer or others before using deadly force).
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 459, 501 (2004) (tracing the declining number of trials in the
United States).
See id. at 492 (documenting the rise in criminal caseload from 33,110 in 1962 to 76,827 in 2002).
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federal criminal trials fell substantially over the same period.87 Juries decided
8.2% of federal criminal cases in 1962 but only 2.04% of federal criminal
cases in 2015.88 During the last four decades of the twentieth century, the
number of federal district court judges doubled, even while the trial rate fell
by 30%.89 Today fewer than 3% of criminal convictions in federal court are
obtained by trial.90 Never before have juries played such a diminished role
in deciding criminal cases.91
State courts too have seen a marked reduction in the number of criminal
trials. Again, the increased volume of criminal cases has not resulted in an
increased number of trials. From 1976 to 2002, according to one study, the
number of state criminal cases resolved by jury trial fell from 3.4% to 1.3%
and the number of state criminal cases resolved by bench trial fell from 5.0%
to 2.0%.92 Although the size of the criminal justice has swelled dramatically
over the past fifty years, 93 trials have all but disappeared as a means of
resolving those cases. This has been consistent for felonies as well as
misdemeanors.94
One reason given for the sharp reduction in criminal trials is the advent
of sentencing guidelines systems in the 1980s and the Supreme Court’s 1989
ruling in Mistretta upholding the constitutionality of such guidelines systems.95
Like most sentencing guidelines systems, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
effectively impose a hefty tax on the exercise of a defendant’s right to trial

87
88
89
90

91
92
93
94
95

See id. at 493 (citing a 30% drop in the number of federal criminal trials from 5,097 in 1962 to 3,574
in 2002).
See Richard Lorren Jolly, Expanding the Search for America’s Missing Jury, 116 MICH. L. REV. 925, 925
(2018) (illustrating the decline in cases decided by jury over time).
Galanter, supra note 85, at 493.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS IN EACH CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT, TABLE 10 (2015) (reporting that
just 2.9% of cases in all circuit and districts went to trial). In 1962, by contrast, 15% of federal
criminal convictions were obtained by trial. See also Galanter, supra note 85, at 493 (2004) (reporting
the percentage of criminal dispositions by trial as only 5% in 2002).
See Jolly, supra note 88, at 925 (“Juries today determine fewer cases than at any other point in the
nation’s history.”).
Galanter, supra note 85, at 510.
See id. at 492 (2004) (showing the rise in criminal caseload from 33,110 in 1962 to 76,827 in 2002).
See id. at 510 (“[T]rials as a portion of felony dispositions fell from 8.9 percent in 1976 to 3.2 percent
in 2002.”).
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that Congress may delegate the
task of formulating sentencing guidelines to a judicial commission). Fifteen years later, the Court
determined that the mandatory nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
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and, by increasing the cost of exercising the right, discourage its use.96 Other
changes in the criminal justice system have been put forward as reasons for
the decrease in criminal trials, including the proliferation of mandatory
minimum sentences,97 policies of the Department of Justice and state and
local prosecutors regarding plea bargaining practices, 98 and charging
decisions and priorities resulting in a different mix of cases. Others argue
that judges have come to see themselves more as managerial technocrats
encouraging parties to reach a mutually agreeable settlement rather than
arbiters of the law presiding over trials.99
The disappearance of criminal jury trials has coincided with a precipitous
increase in the use of incarceration as a tool to punish and control
populations that are the subjects of the criminal justice system. Even as the
crime rate fell, incarceration rates continued to rise through the 1980s, 1990s
and 2000s. 100 Throughout most of the twentieth century, the U.S.
incarceration rate remained relatively static at around 110 people
incarcerated per thousand.101 But around 1980, the incarcerated population
grew at an astounding rate until the Great Recession in 2008, when it peaked
at just over 750 people incarcerated per thousand.102
The United States Supreme Court recently has begun to reckon with the
reality that trials of any kind have become a rarity in criminal adjudication.103
96

97
98

99
100
101
102

103

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines do this by allowing for a reduction in the criminal offense level
for “acceptance of responsibility.” See U.S.S.G. Manual § 3E1.1. Although such a reduction is still
theoretically possible for a defendant who exercise their right to trial, few judges would grant such
a reduction after a trial in which the defendant was found guilty. See U.S.S.G. Manual § 3E1.1,
application note 2.
See Galanter, supra note 85, at 495 (suggesting the impact of mandatory minimums on criminal trial
rates in addition to increased funding for law enforcement).
See, e.g., Ashcroft Memo (Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to All Federal
Prosecutors, Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges,
and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003)).
See Steven Baicker-McKee, Reconceptualizing Managerial Judges, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 353, 354 (2015)
(portraying judges as coercive toward settlement of cases on their dockets).
See William T. Pizzi, The Effects of the “Vanishing Trial” on Our Incarceration Rate, 28 FED. SENT’G REP.
330, 330 (2016) (tracking the increase of the U.S. incarceration rate through the decades).
See Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of Imprisonment in the United States: Twentieth Century Patterns and
Twenty-First Century Prospects, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1225, 1226–27 (2010).
PRISONERS
IN
2019,
BUREAU
OF
JUSTICE
STATISTICS
(October
2020),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p19_sum.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JL8G-9QJW]
(describing the change in rates of imprisonment over time).
See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012)
(“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the
result of guilty pleas.”) (citing DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF STAT., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, ONLINE, TABLE 5.22.2009; DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., S.
ROSENMERKEL, M. DUROSE & D. FAROLE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS 2006).
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Because of the prevalence of juryless adjudication, the Court in Lafler v. Cooper
and Missouri v. Frye found that the constitutional guarantee of the effective
assistance of counsel extended not only to trial but also to plea
negotiations.104 For the vast majority of criminal defendants, the charge of
conviction and length of sentence is determined privately, between
prosecutor and defense lawyer, rather than in a public and adversarial
proceeding.105
The absence of criminal trials and accompanying disappearance of jurors
from the architecture of American criminal justice has had profound effects
on how decisions are reached and how Americans conceive of the system of
deciding criminal cases. As efficiency has come to dominate discussions of
criminal courts, democratic ideals of citizen involvement in these important
decisions have taken a back seat. Community members have lost the ability
to weigh in on issues of importance by serving on juries and even judges are
not meaningfully able to keep tabs on police and prosecutors, if all they are
ordinarily called upon to do is accept plea agreements that were negotiated
in private.106
The shift away from community involvement in determining guilt has a
profound impact on both how communities conceive of the criminal process
and on how criminal defendants are impacted. Bench trials can result in an
“adversarial deficit” for criminal defendants that allows police and
prosecutorial practices to go unchecked.107 But even in a system that rarely
sees criminal defendants exercise their right to trial by jury, the existence of
the right has an effect on outcomes as parties engage in plea negotiation “in
the shadow of trial” and ever-cognizant of what a jury might decide. 108

104

105

106

107
108

See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162 (holding that, during plea negotiations, defendants are “entitled to the
effective assistance of competent counsel”); Frye, 566 U.S. at 143–44 (reasoning that, because of the
high rate of cases resolved by plea negotiations, “it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee
of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process”).
See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)
(“To a large extent, this kind of horse trading determines who goes to jail and for how long. That
is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system.”).
See Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Criminal Justice Citizenship, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2020) (“The
decline of the jury trial has upset the carefully balanced separation of powers that should define the
American system.”) (citing Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REV 989, 1033–34 (2006)).
Sean Doran, John D. Jackson, & Michael L. Siegel, Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials,
23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 27 (1995).
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969
(1992); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
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Although plea negotiation occurs in an imperfect market, legal entitlements
can be bargained away by defendants in a way that dramatically affects
sentencing and other outcomes.
III. THE RISE OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Although rates of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration have risen
dramatically over the past half century,109 the impact of the criminal justice
system is felt not only in incarceration and other direct consequences but also
by the collateral consequences that flow from a criminal conviction. 110
Scholars and reformers have turned their attention to the impact of collateral
consequences in recent years and have come to recognize this parallel
criminal justice system as troubling and pernicious.111 The informal system
of collateral consequences that attend a criminal conviction suffers from the
same pervasive racial bias and deficits of reliability as the formal system of
criminal adjudication but also is much harder to reform due to its
decentralized nature. 112 This is especially true in the world of low-level
offenses, where defendants are much less likely to serve time behind bars but
can still suffer all manner of consequences in their lives as a result of even a
misdemeanor conviction.113
In the years since the Supreme Court last addressed the issue of jury trial
rights for presumptively petty offenses,114 access by public and private actors
to criminal histories has changed dramatically. The advent of electronic

109

110

111

112
113

114

See John D. King, Beyond ‘Life and Liberty,’ The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R. C. L. L. REV.
1, 20 (2013) (correlating the rise of crimes, arrests, and prosecutions that have flowed from the
broken windows policing model in recent decades).
See id. at 23 (“These collateral consequences often constitute a far more serious form of punishment
than the direct consequences of a conviction, especially for the many people convicted of low-level
crimes who are never sentenced to incarceration.”).
See id. at 33 (explaining the ability of collateral consequences to operate outside of the scope of the
criminal justice system because such consequences are not imposed in open court or subjected to a
proportionality analysis).
See id. at 46–47 (listing some of the challenges in targeting the system of collateral consequences for
reform).
See generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018); Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret C.
Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21 (“Modern
criminal convictions do much more than send people to prison and impose fines pursuant to court
order. Convictions are the basis for scores or hundreds of additional state and federal consequences,
automatically imposed or potentially made available by statute or regulation.”).
See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (holding that offenses carrying a
maximum prison term of six months or less are presumed “petty” for the purposes of the Sixth
Amendment).
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databases and ubiquitous internet access has amplified the criminal
backgrounds of those convicted of all kinds of offenses and made them easy
for any potential employer or government agency to find.115 This easy access
has come as government and private parties have multiplied the ways in
which a prior criminal conviction can interfere with one’s life. 116
Researchers have compiled thousands of separate collateral consequences
that attach to various kinds of criminal convictions at federal, state, and local
levels.117 These post-conviction consequences are enacted by federal, state,
and local governments and encompass convictions from other states and
even juvenile adjudications. 118 Beyond the most basic and well-known
immigration-related consequences, it is inconceivable that any judge,
prosecutor, or defense lawyer could know all of the ways in which a particular
charge might result in a life-altering restriction of freedom after the fact.119
Of course, the phenomenon of collateral consequences is not new. Justice
Powell concurred separately in Argersinger v. Hamlin to emphasize that it might
be the fact of conviction, rather than the fact of imprisonment, that has the
greatest impact on the person convicted of a crime.120 Criminal history has

115

116

117
118
119

120

See John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 31 (2013) [hereinafter Beyond “Life and Liberty”] (“Criminal background checks are now quick,
cheap, and available online, and can search all levels of criminal conviction from throughout the
country.”).
See National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.,
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/national-inventory-collateral-consequences-conviction
[https://perma.cc/SQV9-TQZ2] (last visited May 31, 2021); see generally CECELIA KLINGELE,
MARGARET C. LOVE & JENNY M. ROBERTS, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2016). On increased access to criminal
backgrounds, see also King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”, supra note 115, at 31 n.193 (chronicling the
inability of a convicted criminal to escape their convictions).
KLINGELE, LOVE & ROBERTS, supra note 116.
See In re Zoie H., 937 N.W.2d 801, 807–09 (2020) (addressing whether the seriousness consideration
applies to juvenile adjudications).
For an interesting proposal and taxonomy of collateral consequences, see Emily Ahdieh, The
Deportation Trigger: Collateral Consequences and the Constitutional Right to a Trial by Jury, 30 GEO. MASON
U. C.R. L.J. 65 (2019). The author distinguishes first between collateral consequences that are
certain to be imposed and those that are only imposed based on the discretion of some other actor,
and then distinguishes further between collateral consequences imposed by the jurisdiction of
conviction and those imposed by another jurisdiction.
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 47–48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The consequences
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief period served under the sometimes deplorable
conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal record in employability, are frequently of
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label ‘petty.’ Serious consequences also
may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. . . . Losing one’s driver’s license is
more serious for some individuals than a brief stay in jail.”).
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been called a “negative curriculum vitae” 121 and “a form of electronic
branding.” 122 As the data continues to accumulate showing the racially
disparate and unreliable outcomes of the criminal justice system—especially
the misdemeanor criminal justice system—the parallel system of collateral
consequences acts as a magnifier of these disparities and injustices.
The problems of collateral consequences and mass incarceration are not
solved by simply reducing penalties for low-level offenses. Over the past ten
years, many states have legalized the possession of marijuana, while others
have reduced the potential penalties and even eliminated the possibility of
jail time. 123 Other jurisdictions have informally “decriminalized” the
possession and use of marijuana, with prosecutors agreeing not to seek jail
time. 124 While reducing the impact of the direct consequences of these
convictions, however, such policies have not addressed the collateral
consequences of what remains in most states a criminal conviction. Except
where state legislation has explicitly legalized this behavior, these reforms
may have succeeded only in reducing the procedural safeguards for
defendants and widening the net of the criminal justice system and the
collateral consequences that go along with a conviction.125
IV. LOWER COURT RESPONSES TO DUNCAN
Recent cases show a willingness of lower courts to push back on the
restrictive application of Duncan and to expand the scope of the jury right.
And while the expansion of the right to trial by jury on a case-by-case basis
is a welcome development, the reasoning of these cases casts doubt on the
continued viability of the petty offense doctrine more generally.

121

122
123

124
125

James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177 (2008). See also John P. Gross, What Matters More: A Day in
Jail or a Criminal Conviction?, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 55, 85–86 (2013) (discussing the difference
in availability of criminal records from when Argersinger was decided and today).
Gross, supra note 121, at 86.
See Deborah M. Ahrens, Retroactive Legality: Marijuana Convictions and Restorative Justice in an Era of
Criminal Justice Reform, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 383 (discussing the mainstream trend
toward decriminalization and legalization of marijuana).
See id. (detailing the changed perspective of prosecutors toward marijuana convictions).
See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
1751, 1816–17 (2013) (“[R]eforms that do no more than reduce penalties are of limited benefit to
noncitizen defendants because convictions can still trigger immigration consequences . . . . [W]here
such reforms result in reduced access to counsel, noncitizens will be much less likely to become
aware of the removal consequences that may still follow other minor offenses.”).
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Jean-Baptiste Bado, a pastor from Burkina Faso, arrived in the United
States in 2005 seeking asylum based on his political and religious beliefs.126
While his asylum application was pending, however, he was charged in the
District of Columbia with three counts of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a
minor. 127 The charges were each punishable by a maximum term of
incarceration of 180 days and a maximum fine of $1,000. 128 Although
categorized under D.C. law as a misdemeanor, the charge is also considered
an aggravated felony for purposes of United States immigration law,129 and
any conviction of such a charge would render Bado ineligible for asylum130
and removable from the United States.131
Although D.C. law provides for criminal jury trials only in cases for which
the maximum punishment exceeds six months,132 Bado requested a jury trial
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. The trial judge denied his request for a
jury trial and, at the conclusion of a bench trial, convicted Bado of one count
of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor. On appeal, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals considered whether the immigration
consequences of Bado’s conviction were relevant to the consideration of the
“seriousness” of the charge against him and entitled him to a jury trial. By a
vote of 6-2, the Court held that it did, and the Court reversed his
misdemeanor conviction.
Sitting en banc, the Bado majority began with the presumption that the
offense in question was petty because it was punishable by no more than 180
days in jail and a $1,000 fine. As the Supreme Court instructed in Blanton,
however, the D.C. Court of Appeals went on to consider whether additional
potential penalties were sufficient to overcome the presumption of pettiness
and trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury.
The Court found that the penalty of deportation, along with the other
126
127
128

129
130

131
132

See Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. 2018) (providing background information
regarding the appellant fleeing from Burkina Faso).
See id. (halting his application because if convicted, Bado would be barred from receiving political
asylum).
See D.C. Code § 22-3010.01 (2020) (specifying that an individual convicted under this code section
“shall be imprisoned for not more than 180 days, or fined not more than the amount set forth in §
22-3571.01, or both.”).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (listing the sexual abuse of a minor as an “aggravated felony”).
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (excepting from eligibility aliens convicted by a final judgement of
a particularly serious crime who constitute a danger to the community); see also 1158(b)(2)(B)(i)
(defining an “aggravated felony” as a particularly serious crime).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time
after admission is deportable.”).
See D.C. Code § 16-705(b)(1)(A) (2020) (allowing a trial by jury for offenses which are punishable by
imprisonment for more than 180 days or fine or penalty exceeding $1,000).

840

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:4

penalties that the D.C. Council attached to the offense, were relevant and
sufficiently serious to require trial by jury.
The Bado Court found that deportation was a far more serious additional
consequence than the penalties considered by the Supreme Court in either
Blanton or in Nachtigal: “Like incarceration, deportation separates a person
from established ties to family, work, study, and community. In this forced
physical separation, it is similar ‘in severity [to] the loss of liberty that a prison
term entails.’” 133 In describing the devastating personal and community
consequences of deportation, the D.C. Court of Appeals acknowledged that
“removal is considered by many immigrants to be worse than incarceration,
such that ‘preserving the . . . right to remain in the United States may be
more important . . . than any potential jail sentence.’” 134 Based on the
severity of the immigration-related consequence of even a misdemeanor
conviction for Bado, the Court held that the situation presented the “rare
situation” that the Court had described in Blanton in which the defendant was
entitled to a trial by jury even though the statutory maximum term of
imprisonment did not “puncture the six-month incarceration line.”135
Rejecting the prosecution’s argument that deportation was not a
“penalty” that should be considered in the analysis regarding seriousness, the
Bado Court held that deportation was clearly a penalty and that the Blanton
analysis did not meaningfully distinguish between penal and civil
sanctions.136 When the Supreme Court in Blanton referred to evaluating the
seriousness of an offense based upon the penalties attached to that offense,
the Court was clear that it meant more than just the maximum term of
incarceration:
In using the word ‘penalty,’ we do not refer solely to the maximum prison
term authorized for a particular offense. A legislature’s view of the
seriousness of an offense also is reflected in the other penalties that it attaches
to the offense. We thus examine ‘whether the length of the authorized prison
term or the seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself to require a
jury trial.’137
133
134

135
136
137

Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1250 (D.C. 2018) (quoting Blanton v. City of North Las
Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989)).
Id. at 1251 (quoting Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017)); see also Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (calling deportation “a particularly severe ‘penalty’”) (quoting Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)
(noting that “deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile”).
Bado, 186 A.3d at 1252 (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543).
See id. at 1252 (refusing to find that Blanton’s use of the term penalty referred solely to the statutory
“penalties,” but also to other penalties which attach to an offense).
Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542 (internal citations and punctuation omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968)).
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Although the Blanton Court found that the penalties at issue in that case
—a driver’s license suspension—did not rise to the level of seriousness that
triggered the federal constitutional right to jury trial, the Court did factor
that collateral consequence into its calculus. The Bado Court held that it
made no difference that the sentencing court itself could not order
deportation as a direct consequence of the criminal conviction, or even that
the immigration-related consequence was imposed by an entirely separate
sovereign. Because the consequence to Bado of a conviction was sufficiently
serious, held the Court, he was entitled to a trial by jury pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment.
The majority in Bado was untroubled by two pragmatic arguments made
by the dissenting judges. First, the dissent argued that the majority opinion
presented an unacceptable anomaly in treatment between citizen and noncitizen defendants. Second, the dissent warned that the majority opinion
promised to set courts on a slippery slope of defendants arguing that their
subjective circumstances rendered an otherwise apparently petty offense
serious as applied to them. With regard to the “slippery slope” argument,
the Bado majority simply held that this was not “a factor whose relevance can
be gleaned from Blanton, which focused on the possible penalties faced by the
accused . . . .”138
In his concurring opinion, Judge Washington focused on the disparity
that the decision had created between citizens and non-citizens charged with
the same offense. Although the outcome was, in his opinion, faithful to the
standard set forth in Blanton, the resulting constitutional disparity “could
undermine the public’s trust and confidence in our courts to resolve criminal
cases fairly” and should be remedied by the legislature.139 The statutory fix,
of course, would be for the legislature to guarantee trial by jury for any
criminal case. Restoring this right, according to Judge Washington, “could
have the salutary effect of elevating the public’s trust and confidence that the
government is more concerned with courts protecting individual rights and
freedoms than in ensuring that courts are as efficient as possible in bringing
defendants to trial.”140

138

139
140

Bado, 186 A.3d at 1256; see also id. at 1260 n.35 (“The government also argues that, if the possibility
of removal is considered in a Blanton analysis, all sorts of other consequences that may follow after
a conviction could also be factors, such as termination of employment and ineligibility for gun
ownership. These are not before us.”).
See Bado, 186 A.3d at 1262 (Washington, J., concurring) (calling upon the legislature to address the
disparity between citizens and noncitizens).
Id. at 1264 (Washington, J., concurring).
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Just a few months after the D.C. Court of Appeals decided Bado, the
Court of Appeals of New York addressed the same issue and came to the
same conclusion. In People v. Suazo,141 the defendant was initially charged
with a variety of domestic assault-related offenses, which entitled him to a
trial by jury. Just prior to trial, however, the prosecution moved to reduce
certain of the offenses to attempts, which lowered the maximum potential
term of incarceration for any single charge to three months.142 The noncitizen defendant, Saylor Suazo, argued that the consequences of a
conviction for him included not only the direct consequences that could be
imposed by the sentencing judge but also deportation.143 On this basis, he
argued that he was entitled to a trial by jury under Duncan and Blanton. The
judge denied Suazo’s motion for a jury trial, heard the case without a jury,
and convicted Suazo of several of the charged offenses.
Reviewing the conviction, the Suazo Court held that “[t]here can be no
serious dispute that, if deemed a penalty for Sixth Amendment purposes,
deportation or removal is a penalty of the utmost severity.”144 Not only can
the process entail detention that can far exceed the length of any criminal
sentence that might have resulted, the end result—permanent separation
from “friends, family, home, and livelihood”—often far exceeds in severity
than any period of incarceration that would result from a low-level offense.145
As in Bado, the prosecution argued that, although deportation was
undoubtedly a serious consequence of a criminal conviction, it was merely a
civil collateral consequence and so should not be factored into the Sixth

141
142

143

144
145

See People v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168 (N.Y. 2018) (holding that a noncitizen defendant charged with
a deportable crime was entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment).
See id. at 171–72 (discussing how the prosecutor reduced the charges before trial to offenses that
were triable without a jury). This “strategic undercharging” is an example of prosecutorial
gamesmanship. See, e.g., Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775 (2016)
(explaining why and when prosecutors are more likely to engage in strategic undercharging); John
D. King, Gamesmanship and Criminal Process, 58 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 47 (2021) (exploring various
examples of prosecutorial gamesmanship in the criminal justice system and how these practices
impact the legitimacy of the system).
The prosecution agreed that conviction of certain of the charged offenses would subject Suazo to
deportation but argued that such collateral consequences of a criminal conviction were not relevant
for purposes of determining whether a defendant has a right to trial by jury. See Suazo, 118 N.E.3d
at 172 (discussing how the prosecution opposed defendant’s motion solely on the grounds that
“deportation is a collateral consequence arising out of federal law that does not constitute a criminal
penalty for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial”).
Id. at 175.
See id. at 176 (“A noncitizen who is adjudicated deportable may first face additional detention,
followed by the often-greater toll of separation from friends, family, home, and livelihood by actual
forced removal from the country and return to a land to which that person may have no significant
ties.”).
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Amendment analysis. 146 Moreover, argued the prosecution, it was the
federal government—a separate sovereign—that was imposing the
consequence, so it had no relevance to the seriousness with which New York
viewed the offense.
The Court of Appeals of New York rejected both of these arguments.
First, the Suazo Court held that deportation and criminal convictions are so
“enmeshed” and closely connected to each other that deportation should be
factored into the determination of seriousness.147 The Suazo Court drew no
distinction between collateral consequences that operated as a result of New
York state or federal law, holding instead that the collateral consequence of
deportation “reflects society’s view that the misconduct underlying the
conviction is of the type that violates social norms of proper behavior and
stirs community outrage to such an extreme extent that it provides a basis for
the convicted person to be exiled from home, family, community, and
country.”148 The Suazo Court pointed out that the Supreme Court had only
considered other state-imposed consequences in its analysis of the petty
offense exception to the jury trial right and had never held that federallyimposed penalties must be excluded from that analysis “simply because they
are imposed by a legislature other than the local one.”149
As in Bado, the Suazo Court chose not to address the question of disparity
between citizen and noncitizen defendants charged with the same offense.
Acknowledging the prosecution’s argument that the Sixth Amendment “does
not permit a distinction between the right to a jury trial for citizens and
noncitizens,”150 the Suazo Court held that the issue was not properly before
it and so did not decide it.151
The Suazo dissent argued that the only relevant criteria in the seriousness
analysis were “the penalties imposed by the New York State Legislature for
the specific offense at issue.” 152 In addition, the dissent argued that any
consideration of deportation would undercut the objective analysis of
146
147

148

149
150
151
152

See id. at 176–77.
See id. at 177 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010)) (stating that deportation is
intimately related to the criminal process and often inevitable for a large number of noncitizens
convicted of crimes).
Id. at 179 (emphasis added); see also id. at 177 (“The salient fact is that a legislative body authorized
to attach a penalty to a state conviction has determined that the crime warrants the onerous penalty
of deportation.”).
Id.
Id. at 181.
See id. (declining to address the issue of whether a citizen in the defendant’s position would have
been entitled to a jury trial when charged with an otherwise deportable offense).
Id. at 183 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
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seriousness that the Supreme Court had prescribed.153 Finally, the dissent
argued that the majority’s approach would send courts down a slippery slope,
and that no clear line could be drawn between the immigration consequences
at issue in that case and future cases involving collateral consequences,
including, for example, the loss of public housing.154
Deportation is, of course, not the only collateral consequence that can
elevate an offense from presumptively petty to serious. The state of Nevada
passed a law limiting the right to carry a firearm of those people convicted of
misdemeanor domestic battery. Although the maximum sentence for a
conviction of the misdemeanor domestic battery remained six months and
therefore within the presumption of pettiness established in Blanton,155 the
Supreme Court of Nevada held that the firearm-related collateral
consequence rebutted that presumption and entitled any defendant charged
with that offense to a jury trial.156 The unanimous en banc opinion was short
and straightforward:
[A]lthough not included in the statute proscribing misdemeanor domestic
battery, our Legislature has imposed a limitation on the possession of a
firearm in Nevada that automatically and directly flows from a conviction
for misdemeanor domestic battery. In our opinion, this new penalty . . .
“clearly reflect[s] a legislative determination that the offense [of
misdemeanor domestic battery] is a serious one.”157

This decision overruled an earlier decision by the same court158 and is
further evidence of a willingness on the part of state courts to broadly
interpret the jury trial right in light of the broad and expanding web of
collateral consequences.

153

154

155
156
157
158

See id. at 185 (“[T]he Supreme Court has explicitly rejected consideration of a defendant’s
circumstances as part of the penalty analysis: an objective indication of the seriousness with which
society regards the offense . . . is used to determine whether a jury trial is required, not the
particularities of an individual case.”) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
See id. at 187 arguing that the majority’s opinion opened the door to apportion severity “‘when . . .
so many civil laws today impose similarly severe sanctions’”) (quoting Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct.
1204, 1231 (2018).
See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (presuming that society will regard
an offense that is punishable by a term of six months or less to be “petty”).
See Andersen v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 448 P.3d 1120, 1124 (Nev. 2019) (“[T]he right affected here
convinces us that the additional penalty is so severe as to categorize the offense as serious.”).
Id. at 1123–24 (citing Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543).
See id. (concluding that misdemeanor of domestic battery is a serious offense, thus overturning
Amezcua).
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The federal constitutional guarantee, of course, is only a floor beneath
which states cannot sink.159 State courts are free to give a more protective
analysis to state guarantees of jury trial rights, and state legislatures are free
to enact statutory safeguards extending the right to trial by jury to a broader
class of criminal defendants than is encompassed by the Sixth Amendment.
V. MOVING BEYOND THE PRESUMPTION OF PETTINESS
The dramatic rise in collateral consequences has profoundly changed the
reality of low-level criminal adjudication in the last few decades. Punishment
following a criminal conviction is no longer a matter of incarceration,
threatened incarceration, and fines. 160 Punishment now consists of those
things but also a host of collateral consequences, some internal to the criminal
justice system but many external to that system. Justice Powell’s concurring
opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin questioned the centrality of imprisonment to
the analysis of whether the right to counsel extended to misdemeanors: the
rationale in the majority opinion “for extending the right to counsel to all
cases in which the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies equally
well to cases in which other penalties may be imposed.” 161 The same
rationale applies to the jury right, especially as the realities of today’s criminal
justice system demonstrate that direct punishment often pales in comparison
with the collateral consequences of a conviction.
Today, an entire system of collateral consequences has evolved, and does
not respect any boundaries between “serious” and “petty” offenses.
Although felonies carry a more serious stigma and more certain extra-judicial
consequences, many crimes that carry short potential jail sentences can also
trigger these life-altering formal and informal penalties. 162 Discussion of
discrete single collateral consequences can never capture the entire “web” of
consequences that alter a convicted person’s life. It is the marking as a
convicted person that opens one up to further punishment by state and

159

160

161
162

See Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1205–06 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he doctrine is one of federal
constitutional law. It does not prevent the states—or the federal government—from granting a jury
trial right in petty offenses; it speaks only to when the United States Constitution mandates such a
right.”).
See John Gross, What Matters More: A Day in Jail or a Criminal Conviction?, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 55, 80 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court decisions in Argersinger and Scott failed to predict
the “wide range of enmeshed penalties that result from a criminal conviction” today).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 52 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
See John Gross, What Matters More: A Day in Jail or a Criminal Conviction?, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 55, 81 (2013) (“It would be a mistake to look at a specific consequence of a conviction; instead,
we must view all of the potential consequences of a conviction as a web of enmeshed penalties.”).
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private actors, which happens today in a way that is markedly different from
even the recent past, when cases like Duncan and Blanton were decided.
As with the right to counsel,163 the presumptions and premises underlying
the doctrine of the right to trial by jury have been undermined by the
trajectory of the criminal justice system. The rise of collateral consequences
has rendered incarceration an imperfect and inadequate lodestar to
determining the seriousness of an offense. As a result, courts should embrace
a broader understanding of the federal constitutional right to trial by jury in
criminal cases, state legislatures should enact legislative assurances of the
right to trial by jury in all criminal cases, and advocates for those accused of
crimes should be aggressively litigating the right to trial by jury in cases that
involve low-level offenses.
A. The Supreme Court should expand the scope of the right to a jury trial
Justice Black referred to the judicially-created petty offense exception as
the “judicial mutilation of our written Constitution.” 164 Although that
perspective never commanded a majority, the Supreme Court earlier had
acknowledged that the precise contours of what constitutes a petty and a
serious crime are fluid and evolving with history, holding that “a penalty once
thought to be mild may come to be regarded as so harsh as to call for the jury
trial, which the Constitution prescribes.”165 Because of the evolving realities
of low-level criminal charging, adjudication, and the collateral consequences
that now result, the Court should revisit this doctrine.
Recent developments in Sixth Amendment doctrine supports a broad
reconsideration of the scope of the jury trial right and whether cases
recognizing a petty offense exception were wrongly decided. In Ramos v.
Louisiana, the Court overruled clear existing precedent on the issue of nonunanimous jury verdicts, holding that a state rule allowing for conviction by
a non-unanimous jury violates the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Apodaca v. Oregon had held exactly
the contrary almost a half century earlier.167

163
164
165
166
167

See King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”, supra note 115 (describing the impact of the evolution of the
criminal justice system on the right to counsel).
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring).
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937).
See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1398–99 (2020) (overruling Apodaca and holding that the
Sixth Amendment requires conviction by unanimous jury verdict).
See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972) (holding that nonunanimous jury verdicts in
criminal trials do not violate the Sixth Amendment).
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One of the fascinating aspects of the various opinions in Ramos was the
Justices’ competing views on the doctrine of stare decisis, given that none of
them appear to have considered Apodaca to have been correctly decided.
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, avoids the thicket of stare decisis by arguing that Apodaca was such a
fractured decision that it did not create any relevant precedent that bound
the Court. 168 Because of the unique nature of the way that Apodaca was
decided, argues Justice Gorsuch, the Court could rule that the Constitution
forbids non-unanimous juries and not really have to overrule anything. In a
dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and in relevant part by
Justice Kagan, Justice Alito argues that, whether or not it was correctly
decided, Apodaca had established a precedent that had been settled for nearly
fifty years and that the Court should respect, calling Apodaca “an important
and long-established decision.”169 Seeing no reason to disturb the precedent
even while failing to defend the logic of it, the dissenters would have affirmed
Ramos’s conviction and allowed states to use non-unanimous juries.
In Ramos, three of the Justices said there effectively was no precedent to
overrule and three others would have followed the precedent that allowed
for non-unanimous jury verdicts. The three remaining Justices
acknowledged the precedent but agreed that it should be reversed, each
writing separately. Justice Thomas took the most extreme and least
deferential approach to stare decisis, arguing that if the Supreme Court
believes a precedent is wrongly decided, it is under no obligation to follow
that precedent and should not follow it. Any stricter understanding of stare
decisis “does not comport with [the Court’s] judicial duty under Article III
because it elevates demonstrably erroneous decisions—meaning decisions
outside the realm of permissible interpretation—over the text of the
Constitution and other duly enacted federal law.”170
Justice Sotomayor proposed another standard that would give relatively
little deference to prior rulings in criminal cases, arguing that the doctrine of
stare decisis is least powerful in such cases involving a question of the
constitutionality of trial procedures, especially in cases that could result in the

168

169
170

See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1398–99 (“[W]hile Justice Powell’s vote secured a favorable judgment for
the States in Apodaca, it’s never been clear what rationale could support a similar result in future
cases.”).
Id. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1421 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
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defendant’s loss of liberty.171 After quoting the Court’s ruling in Alleyne that
“[t]he force of stare decisis is at its nadir in cases concerning [criminal]
procedur[e] rules that implicate fundamental constitutional protections,” 172
Justice Sotomayor argued that
the constitutional protection here ranks among the most essential: the right
to put the State to its burden, in a jury trial that comports with the Sixth
Amendment, before facing criminal punishment. . . . Where the State’s
power to imprison . . . rests on an erroneous interpretation of the jury-trial
right, the Court should not hesitate to reconsider its precedents.173

Justice Kavanaugh attempted in Ramos to articulate a more deferential
standard for when the Court should overrule precedent, taking a more
conservative approach than Justices Thomas or Sotomayor. Like Justice
Sotomayor, Justice Kavanaugh recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis
is relatively weak in constitutional cases, as opposed to statutory cases. 174
With this in mind, he proposed that the Court should overrule constitutional
precedent when (1) that precedent is “grievously or egregiously wrong”; (2)
the precedent “has caused significant negative jurisprudential or real-word
consequences”; and (3) the overruling of the precedent would not “unduly
upset reliance interests.”175 A more stringent test than those proposed by the
other dissenters, Justice Kavanaugh’s proposal “set[s] a high (but not
insurmountable) bar for overruling a precedent.”176
The various opinions in Ramos demonstrate an opening for the Court to
reconsider another constitutional criminal procedure decision that drastically
curtailed the right of the criminally accused. Just as the Court showed a
willingness to revisit a longstanding and erroneous interpretation of the
constitutional meaning of “jury” in Ramos, the Court should revisit the
interpretation of the meaning of “criminal prosecution” for purposes of the
jury trial right. As some members of the Court adopt a more absolute
textualism, it becomes more and more difficult to understand that “in all
criminal prosecutions” means “in some criminal prosecutions.” Justice
171

172
173
174

175
176

See id. at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“While overruling precedent must be rare, this Court
should not shy away from correcting its errors where the right to avoid imprisonment pursuant to
unconstitutional procedures hangs in the balance.”).
Alleyne v. United Sates, 570 U.S. 99, 116 n.5 (2013).
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1409 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Justice Kavanaugh quoted Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion in Citizens United, in which
he wrote that the Court “must balance the importance of having constitutional questions decided
against the importance of having them decided right.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1413 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring)).
See id. at 1414–15 (outlining the circumstances under which the Court should overrule precedent).
Id. at 1415.
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Gorsuch’s recent opinions in Bostock and McGirt were notable not only for
their far-reaching results but also for the textualist logic by which the court
arrived at those decisions.177 And the fact that the more liberal justices signed
onto the textualist reasoning in those opinions may signal that “textualism is
now the leading method of statutory interpretation before the Supreme
Court.”178 As a more absolute textualism takes hold, principles of judicial
restraint carry less weight.179 A wider variety of judges, then, might be willing
to consider arguments that the constitutional right to trial by jury applies—
as the language suggests—to all criminal offenses.
Whether or not the doctrinal and historical critiques of the Court’s
creation of the petty offense exception are correct, contemporary
developments demand its reconsideration. Even if a petty offense exception
were once justified by history and common law, the current doctrine is no
longer a meaningful and workable standard and should be discarded. The
Court should not be hesitant to reverse itself on the issue of the petty offense
exception because it has recently held that principles of stare decisis are at
their weakest in cases involving procedure and in cases involving
constitutional rights. The Court’s recent embrace of the unanimity
requirement and rejection of the precedent in Apodaca demonstrate a path
forward in reconsidering wrong steps in constitutional criminal procedure
that harm criminal defendants and are not textually required.
B. State legislatures should guarantee a jury trial for all criminal offenses
Most states guarantee criminal defendants a broader right to trial by jury
than the federal constitutional guarantee, either by state constitution or
statute.180 Generally, the states can be divided into three groups: (1) those
that guarantee the right to trial by jury for any criminal offense; (2) those that

177

178
179
180

See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 protects gay and transgender employees from being fired on the basis of their sexual
orientation based on the text of the Act); McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (upholding
the text of a treaty granting Indian reservations to certain tribes based on the text of the treaty and
lack of congressional intent otherwise).
Noah Feldman, The Battle Over Scalia’s Legacy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, at 68 (Dec. 17, 2020).
See id. (advancing the theory that there is a tension between principles of judicial restraint,
originalism, and textualism, thus forcing judges to choose).
See T. Ward Frampton, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury Trial Rates Vary by State, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 183, 186 (2012) (noting the variation by jurisdiction of the rights to trial by jury in
criminal cases).
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guarantee the right for any jailable offense; and (3) those that adhere to the
federal constitutional minimum, as explained in Duncan and Blanton.181
Although states generally can be broken into these three categories, there
are subtler distinctions in how the states define those criminal offenses that
trigger a state right to trial by jury. Twenty states provide the right to a jury
trial to virtually anyone charged with a criminal offense.182 Seven additional
states extend this right to anyone charged with a crime that carries any
possibility of incarceration. 183 Three states—Delaware, Hawaii, and New
Mexico—provide a jury right for anyone charged with a criminal offense
punishable by incarceration for much shorter periods of time than would
trigger the federal constitutional jury right.184 Four states expand on the
federal constitutional jury trial right only by allowing the right to those
offenses that were triable to a jury when the relevant state constitutional

181

182

183

184

See Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1265 n.1 (D.C. 2018) (Washington, J., concurring); see
also T. Ward Frampton, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury Trial Rates Vary by State, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 183, 200 (2012) (“A likely source of some interstate variation in jury trial rates . . .
is the fact that most state constitutions contain analogues to the Sixth Amendment that provide
broader jury trial provisions than their federal counterpart.”).
See Murphy, supra note 37, at 172 n.178 (collecting citations to state constitutional provisions and
other authorities that provide for criminal jury trial rights for all criminal offenses). An example of
such a state constitutional provision is North Carolina’s, which provides that “no person shall be
convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court.” N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 24; see also City of Pasco v. Mace, 653 P.2d 618, 625 (Wash. 1982), Bradford v. Longmont
Municipal Court, 830 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Colo. App. 1992).
See Murphy, supra note 37, at 172 n.178 (collecting citations to state constitutional provisions and
other authorities that provide for criminal jury trial rights for any jailable criminal offenses). States
that follow this approach are Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id. Although Alaska’s Constitution guarantees the right to trial
by jury “in all criminal prosecutions,” the Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to
apply only to those offenses that carry some prospect of incarceration. See Frampton, supra note
180 at 200 (contrasting the United States Supreme Court interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
with the Alaska Supreme Court’s interpretation); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402
(Alaska 1970) (extending the right to trial by jury to any criminal offense in which incarceration
may result).
See Murphy, supra note 37, at 173 n.179 (collecting citations to state constitutional provisions and
other authorities that provide for criminal jury trial rights for criminal offenses that allow for some
period incarceration fewer than six months). The Supreme Court of Hawaii has recognized the
right to a trial by jury for any criminal offense carrying a potential term of imprisonment of more
than thirty days, while Delaware and New Mexico provide the right for criminal offenses carrying
maximum terms of incarceration of ninety days or more. Id.
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provisions were enacted.185 Only ten states provide a right to criminal jury
trial that is exactly co-extensive with the federal constitutional minimum.186
State legislatures can avoid the theoretical and practical problems of
evaluating the petty offense exception by simply extending the scope of the
state constitutional right to cover all criminal charges. The experience of the
majority of states shows that this approach is workable and affordable. Even
where states provide broad guarantees of the right to trial by jury for lowlevel offenses, practical considerations limit the exercise of this right. One
powerful disincentive to a defendant’s exercise of the jury right is the “trial
tax” that similarly discourages a defendant going to trial at all. 187 A
sentencing judge intent on punishing a defendant for not pleading guilty can
certainly send a message to a defendant who insists on empaneling a jury, if
that jury ends up convicting. Whenever a judge has discretion to impose a
sentence within a broad range, that judge has the ability to powerfully
incentivize the waiver of any of a defendant’s rights.
Some states have formal mechanisms built in that discourage the use of a
jury by a defendant, especially in low-level cases. Virginia, for example,
provides defendants the right to a jury trial in all criminal cases188 but until
very recently required that the jury impose a sentence in case of conviction.189
The practice of jury sentencing, which still exists in a handful of states, has
the effect of dampening the enthusiasm of defendants for exercising their
right to trial by jury. Before the 2020 legislative change, the Virginia rules
further provided that sentencing juries do not have access to the state’s
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186

187
188

189

See id. at 173 n.180 (collecting citations to state constitutional provisions and other authorities that
provide for criminal jury trial rights for offenses that were eligible for jury trial at the advent of the
provision). States that follow this approach are Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Virginia. Id.
See id. at 173 n.182 (collecting citations to state constitutional provisions and other authority that
provide for criminal jury trial rights equivalent to that of the federal minimum). The states that
provide no protection beyond the federal constitutional minimum are Georgia, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Id.
See Frampton, supra note 180, at 210 (describing the economic burden placed on criminal
defendants through a jury tax which some states have authorized).
See VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“That in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause
and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, and to call for
evidence in his favor, and he shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty.”).
2020 Bill Tracking VA S.B. 5007, https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?202+sum+SB5007
[https://perma.cc/JQM8-GXYA] (summarizing the progress of the recently enacted Virginia law
which puts sentencing in the court’s hands unless the accused requests sentencing by the jury).
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sentencing guidelines, which could moderate the more punitive approach
that some jurors might take and that many defendants would fear.190
CONCLUSION
One of the problems with tying the federal constitutional jury right to
state or local determinations of seriousness is a lack of consistency in federal
constitutional law. The same Sixth Amendment confers a right to trial by
jury to a defendant charged with possession of cocaine on the south side of
the Potomac River in Virginia,191 but not to the same defendant after she
crosses into the District of Columbia.192 The contingency with which the
right applies now varies not only based on geography but also on citizenship
status. A citizen and a noncitizen charged with the same offense in the same
jurisdiction may have different entitlements to the right to trial by jury.193
Variability in the application of federal constitutional rights encourages
states to manipulate their criminal penalty structures to avoid being required
to provide counsel and juries to misdemeanor defendants. Although some
will celebrate this as one of the benefits of federalism, 194 an inconsistent
application can corrode shared national values and erode a perception of
fairness in the judicial system.
Bright-line federal constitutional rules protect federalism by keeping
federal courts from second-guessing state courts on whether a particular set

190
191
192

193

194

See VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-298.01(A) (2019) (“In cases tried by a jury, the jury shall not be presented
any information regarding sentencing guidelines.”).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-260 (incorporating Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-336 for application in the
criminal trial context).
See D.C. CODE § 16-705; see also Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal
Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 149–50 (2009)
(“[T]ying federal rights to the majoritarian democratic preferences of jurisdictions in which
individuals are physically located renders such rights captive to state and local political prerogative.
Moreover, the very process of making federal rights contingent on state and local political borders,
not national citizen status, negatively affects an array of other important values, including the
nation’s shared sense of constitutional commitment and the premise of rights equality associated
with it.”).
See Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1256 (D.C. 2018) (arguing that considering removal a
penalty under Blanton analysis would create an anomaly under which a noncitizen would be entitled
to a jury trial but a citizen would not); New York v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168, 181 (N.Y. 2018)
(denying the argument the Sixth Amendment does not allow a distinction between the right for
citizens and noncitizens).
See Logan, supra note 192, at 161 (“A chief benefit of contingent constitutionalism relates to its
federalism-enforcing characteristics: it permits state and local normative choices to be maintained,
at once preserving what the Anti-Federalists lauded as subnational ‘individuality’ and voiding the
political self-abnegation typically associated with absorption into a federal union.”).
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of facts gives rise to a constitutional violation. It strains the imagination to
classify as “petty” an offense that can lead directly to a person’s permanent
removal from community and country, and so it is difficult to argue with the
conclusion of those courts that have held that a noncitizen has the right to a
jury trial when a conviction would trigger deportation. But this logic divests
the state of power to classify an offense as petty and effectively “designate[s]
Congress as the relevant authority for purposes of determining when a jury
trial is warranted for a [state] crime.”195 A far preferable approach would be
for courts to do away with the petty offense exception and give the federal
constitutional right to trial by jury its broadest application, an approach that
would be categorical, absolute, and predictable.
As the doctrine continues to develop and courts consider whether certain
offenses are “serious” because of the collateral consequences attached to
them, legislatures will be put in the position of having to weigh whether it is
worth imposing a particular collateral consequence if doing so brings with it
additional procedural safeguards. A legislature may decide to eliminate or
forego attaching a collateral consequence (like the loss of firearm rights) to a
particular offense (like domestic assault) to avoid extending a right to trial by
jury to those accused of such a crime. The calculus worries advocates,
especially in the domestic violence context.196 Categorically extending the
jury trial right to all criminal offenses would avoid this weighing altogether
and allow legislatures to decide on which collateral consequences are
appropriate without regard to how those decisions would affect trial
procedures.197
Critics of expanding the scope of the jury trial right focus on the
inefficiency of such a system.198 The experience of those states that already
provide such a right shows this concern to be exaggerated. Moreover, the
inefficiency of empaneling a jury for every criminal offense is not a bug in the
system but a feature. The procedural and financial cost of ensuring a
community voice in the adjudication of guilt could serve to keep the scope
and volume of the criminal justice system relatively small. In Duncan v.
Louisiana, however, the Court embraced efficiency as a virtue in allowing for
195
196

197
198

Suazo, 118 N.E.3d at 188 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
Debra Cassens Weiss, Victim Advocates Concerned After Nevada Top Court Gives Jury Trial Right to Accused
Domestic
Batterers,
A.B.A.
J.
(Sept.
19,
2019,
10:47
AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/victim-advocates-concerned-after-nevada-top-courtgives-jury-trial-right-to-accused-domestic-batterers [https://perma.cc/K989-ZPN2].
See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Zoie H. v. Nebraska, 937 N.W.2d 801 (2020).
See Weiss, supra note 196 (cautioning that misdemeanor courts are not equipped for jury trials and
that expansion of the right could have devastating effects).
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adjudication of petty offenses without a jury, defending the exception to the
jury trial right as allowing for “efficient law enforcement” and “simplified
judicial administration.”199 Because jury trials are expensive, the right to trial
by jury “can therefore be said to have an important social function: It
pressures government resources toward the most destructive conduct within
the polity.”200 The cost of a jury trial can discipline over-charging and overcriminalization.
Even if jury trials are rarely used in states where the right attaches to
misdemeanors, the very option of a defendant to exercise that right changes
the calculus of pre-trial negotiations and can lead to better and fairer
outcomes.201 The threat of a jury trial forces prosecutors to be more careful
in their charging decisions.202 Without a jury to screen for factual guilt and
with almost no prospect of appellate review,203 there is often no meaningful
check on a prosecutor who is inclined to charge low-level offenses where
there is little evidence of guilt.204 Because the direct consequences of most
misdemeanors are so slight, many such prosecutions are disposed of with a
quick guilty plea and no jail time.205 The true consequence to the defendant
is sometimes only discovered well after the conclusion of the criminal case.
A system of adjudication designed to avoid juries is necessarily less
reliable than one that allows for the prospect of jury review, even if that
option is infrequently used. Many misdemeanor courtrooms so value
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200
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391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (“[T]he possible consequences to defendants from convictions for petty
offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and
simplified judicial administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive nonjury
adjudications.”).
Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 7, 15 (1994).
See Bibas, supra note 108, at 2479 (stating that a client’s plea bargaining posture improves when
they have the ability to go to trial).
See Cade, supra note 125, at 1781 (“Noncitizens may well be charged and prosecuted for low-level
offenses irrespective of the merits of their arrests.”); see also Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1705–11 (2010)
(discussing prosecutorial incentives).
See generally Nancy J. King & Michael Heise, Misdemeanor Appeals, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1933 (2019).
See Cade, supra note 125, at 1781 (arguing that “prosecutors are more likely to reflexively file
charges in low-stakes cases, even on weak evidence”); Bowers, supra note 202, at 1700–03; Josh
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1126–27 (2008); Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Managerial Justice & Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 643 fig. 9 (2014).
See John D. King, The Meaning of a Misdemeanor in a Post-Ferguson World: Evaluating the Reliability of Prior
Conviction Evidence, 54 GA. L. REV. 927, 938 (2020) (“As long as the process costs of adjudicating a
misdemeanor exceed the direct consequences of a conviction, it will continue to be a rare defendant
in most misdemeanor systems who fights their charge by going to trial.”); see also Cade, supra note
125, at 1782 (“When it comes to petty cases, prosecutors . . . have an interest in expediently securing
as many convictions as possible, even if the punishment imposed is mild.”).
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efficiency over accuracy and reliability that it can be difficult and costly for a
defendant to exercise the procedural rights that are theoretically available.206
Eliminating the petty offense exception to the jury trial right—whether
by constitutional re-interpretation, legislative enactment, or case-by-case
advocacy—would result in a criminal adjudication system that is more just,
more democratic, and more faithful to the ideals of those who drafted the
constitutional right to trial by jury. As some state courts have begun to
recognize, the direct penalties associated with a particular offense can pale in
comparison with the harsh collateral consequences of a conviction for that
offense. Application of the current federal constitutional doctrine in this area
leads to results that, while understandable, are difficult to square with other
democratic principles. Rather than invite a subjective and unpredictable
case-by-case and defendant-by-defendant analysis of whether a particular
criminal prosecution is “petty” or “serious,” courts and legislatures should
recognize a categorical and absolute right to trial by jury for all criminal
prosecutions.

206

See Cade, supra note 125, at 1784 (“Categorical charging and fixed-price plea deals are efficient
ways of doing business, and prosecutors have little reason to invest in the extra effort that would be
required to give misdemeanor cases particularized evaluation.”).

